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Reviews
Pramod K. Mishra
That sharp, sunny winter morning, I was overseeing a roomful of examinees in Biratnagar as a junior guard. Those exams in the early eighties were cheat-fests; a veritable bazaar of friends and relatives gathered outside the hall to help examinees not yet adept in the art and science of cheating. And nobody could do anything about it. Everyone, including the Campus Chief made out to be doing their duty, like walking those serpentine miles around towns on national occasions in topi and daurasuruwal. As a junior faculty, newly arrived, driven out from the poverty and powerlessness of a Morang village and fled from the caste-terror of India, I had been assigned to guard these mostly town-bred college students, and my pride had swelled in my new-found public role. That morning, it fell on my shoulders to distribute answer books and questions, and ignore what the examinees were actually doing.
I had begun to learn doublespeak and adjust to the Nepali political way of doing things. At an earlier exam, soon after the killing and beating between student groups on campus in the name of the outlawed political parties, the Campus Chief had advised me: "Thoda time luge gaa. Adjust ho jaayiegaa, Mishraji--ghabaraiye mut." Indeed, everywhere around me people were being practical and adjusting--government officials in the offices, businessmen in their dealings, teachers... and the students were also exercising the wisdom of the time--they were being practical in the exams. And I soon learned that those who failed, in spite of being practical, went to India and in three months or so brought their certificates. They were being eminently practical. So exercising my practicality, I had come out of the room and stood in the sun.
Soon the man who was called Observer came on his rounds. In white shirt, cream-colored slacks, and fine leather shoes, this personage had come from Kathmandu, sent to this important eastern town by the Exam Controller's Office to ensure academic honesty in the exams. This was one of the rituals, like many other rituals that suffused life in Nepal during the Panchayat system.
In more than one way, Kathmandu, where I had never been, had a mysterious aura for me. And this man had come from Kathmandu and was a professor there, or so they whispered. I looked up to him, a learned man, a mushroom nose, buck teeth, puffed-up cheeks, wavy hair carefully covering a balding head--blessed with Saraswati seated on his tongue, as my father never failed to remind me about people with learning.
But it turned out that like many another functionary of the Panchayati state, he too pretended to be doing his duty. So he walked the rooms but saw nothing, and spent his time, like all of us, outside, chatting with senior guards, many his longtime friends and acquaintances. With only thirty-odd years' of modern education, every educated person seemed to know everybody else, especially people with links with Kathmandu and established clans. My fellow guard, too, knew him, and he busied the Observer in small talk.
"How is Kathmandu these days?" my fellow guard asked. "It feels like ages since I last visited the Valley."
"It's getting worse. Too expensive; too much crowding. People from all over Nepal, and India, too, seem to be swarming into Kathmandu," he said. His eyes seemed to light up when talking about Kathmandu. But soon it turned out that our esteemed Observer, like the migrants he complained about, had himself made his home in Kathmandu only after finishing university. He came from one of the eastern hill districts, and had land in the plains, which he called "kheti" or "kamat" and a house in Dharan.
"Are you planning to transfer to Dharan then?" my fellow guard asked, prolonging the small talk.
"Who, me? No. Dharan is no longer livable for the likes of us. I have to sell my property there. Since the British made their recruiting camp in Ghopa, it's been filled with the lahures," he said without rancor. To me, he sounded genuinely saddened and defeated by the turn of events in Dharan, something I wasn't much cognizant of.
From a schoolfriend's vivid accounts, I had once imagined Dharan as a dangerous town of Congressi and Communist college fighters, who seemed to imitate the action from the Bollywood silver screen in their street and college lives. But by the time I encountered the Observer, I had made a few trips to Dharan myself and found that Dharan had two main cultural sources. The old source of course was the Hindu aristocracy of the hills that had patterned themselves on the prevailing power structure of the Ranas. In the absence of widespread literacy and historical documentation, the hill aristocracy had no means of keeping the documented memory of their courtier past alive, but the new recognition by the modern state in the past thirty years had revived its powers and prestige which had only been subordinated to Ranas and royal Thakuris during the Rana regime, not actually eliminated. In the past thirty years, the first wave of the hill aristocracy had begun to acquire large tracts of new land in the rural areas in the plains. And many had built houses in Dharan. In the traditional power structure, this aristocracy exercised overwhelming influence in the region.
The other cultural source for Dharan formed a triangle with Hong Kong and Darjeeling. Hong Kong supplied pounds, a glimpse of the world beyond, which included Hong Kong capitalism and British cantonment culture but also, through glossy Chinese magazines, the Communist revolution in China. And Darjeeling, the remnants of the foreign glamour and confidence of the Raj, which included its many missionary schools, and the native subversiveness; its population considering itself, in many ways, free from the hangups of Nepali Brahminism and touched with the influences of the Bengali culture.
The Gurkha soldiers, the lucky among these hill tribals, after their retirement had built neat little concrete houses in Dharan. The unimaginative ugliness of conventional concrete buildings stood in sharp contrast to these new, multicolored houses, whose arched, brick-by-brick painted facades showed a willingness to put beauty on display rather than hide it like clan secrets. Though imitative of the outside world, they displayed ambition and aspiration that were quite foreign to their staid, jaded surroundings.
So I was a little surprised at our guest's disappointment with the way Dharan had turned out over the years, for it matched neither with my school friends' description of Hindi filmi personages and college fighters nor with my own experience.
"What do you think of Janakpur?" asked my fellow guard, adding that he had grown up in Janakpur.
"Yes, I went there last year as an Observer," he said and then sucked his teeth in distaste. "Janakpur doesn't look like Nepal at all; it looks like Bihar. There's no Nepali culture left there," he said with a still greater disappointment, as though Janakpur had ever had the kind of Nepali culture that our learned friend wanted.
Of course, I hadn't yet gone to Janakpur, but its association with Bihar revealed a new meaning. For people who hadn't gone to this mythical town knew it as the Videha kingdom of Rajarshi Janak, one of the most respected kings of his time, whenever that was. And, more than history, it was the four-part timeframe of the epic Ramayana in which the town lived in imagination. But the historical Janakpur, despite retaining its Maithili culture, had gone through centuries of political vicissitudes. Indeed, many hill dwellers, who acquired land in the area and settled in the early days, adopted the local way of life, so much so that many Brahmins among them even changed their exotic pahaadi names, such as Pokhrel, Paudel and Dahal, into generic names like Sharma or Upadhyay, readily recognizable in the cross- border culture of the region.
In Biratnagar, I had already had some heated arguments with Madhesi colleagues when they had complained about their second-class status in Nepal. I had begun to maintain my distance, and had all but quarrelled with a Tharu college teacher who had whispered that the Panchayat system deliberately fostered corruption so the "people from the hills" who worked as functionaries of the Nepali state would benefit from it. I had considered these lies--rumors spread to console oneself and one's failures.
But now, that winter morning, supervising cheating in the exams, I came upon a new revelation. The nature of Nepali nationalism was beginning to unfold itself, a kind of nationalism I couldn't find in any textbook. I had thought after my experiences while studying in India that Nepal would be different; that here I would escape from the viciousness of caste hatred, escape from the cruelty I had seen and reacted against. But how can one explain the slap on the steaming cheek of a rickshawala at earth-scorching noon in Patna by a light-skinned student-looking young man (I had seen this scene while walking to the Gandhi museum) and the abuse of the same in midtown Biratnagar by a college student, an activist of the underground Communist Party, whom I knew well?
In the village in Morang, I had grown up noticing the potential among the settlers and the local tribes, in spite of small quarrels, for peace and amity. But the towns, by virtue of their proximity to state power and its ideology, began to appear vicious. In touch with the unspoken power of the state, ethnic identities became more defined, demarcated, rigid, and what the academics call reified. The further up you went in the pyramid of the state power structure, the innocence, despite the hold of the Hindu scriptures and ethnic memories, that existed in the villages by virtue of human vicissitudes, began to melt. It was like a classical Hindu kingdom with all its caste structure and hierarchy intact, albeit complicated by the advent of modernity--ethnicity, nationalism, language politics, the effect of British rule in the neighboring India and India's independence.
This man from Kathmandu was a hill high caste; his last name made it obvious. But he could have been a Congress, Communist or Panche supporter. He could have been to an overseas university and written his thesis about his nation, like many a caste-ist professor of the universities I had attended in India. He could have been anything or anyone, but his prejudices against both the tribals and the people of the plains were hardly different from a prejudiced lay settler from the hills. My father's dictum that Saraswati, once ensconced on one's tongue, purified one's soul, began to lose its hold once confronted with reality. I remembered in those moments of despair a couplet by Kabir, the vernacular intellectual of fifteenth-century India, "Pothi padhi padhi jug muwa, pandit bhayaa na koi; dhai aakhar premka padhe su pandit hoye" (The world killed itself by reading books, but failed to become learned; but those who could read the two-and-a-half letters of 'prem' became good men of learning).
As long as a hill tribe man carried his backbreaking load and lived in grime and ignorance, he was not a threat, not a problem; but as soon as he went abroad and empowered himself after the sacrifice of staying away from his family for years and brought ideas and economic power to the country, he became a threat, made the town uninhabitable. Paternalism is fine; but equality unbearable. So taught the Observer.
From then on, I began to learn fast the nature of Nepali nationalism that the Panchayat system fostered, particularly in the towns. It was only now in this town of power politics in eastern Nepal that I began to understand the difference between the cultural prejudices among various communities in the villages, which arose from the scriptures and ethnic cultural memories, and their viciousness when the individual prejudices found their tacit confirmation and assurance in the corridors of state power.
In the characterization of difference between Dharan, Janakpur and Biratnagar seemed to lay the crux of Nepali nationalism, in which the Rajbanshis of my village figured nowhere. The lahures of Dharan, by virtue of their knowledge of the outside world and power of the Sterling Pound, meagre though it might have been, had transformed themselves from silenced load carriers into citizens with their own sense of competitive knowledge and lifestyles. The people of Biratnagar--traders from India and the hill high castes--had their own sources of political and economic power. Janakpur, by virtue of its cultural proximity to Bihar and its power plays, and by virtue of the powerful Hindu myth, had its own confidence and clout, even though it didn't look like Nepal in my learned colleague's estimation. But where were the Rajbanshis, many of whom, some my classmates, had become rickshaw pullers now? I asked myself. They were in the villages, to be sure; but villages were faceless, and the towns didn't recognize them. They had no power, nor any clout. They had neither the resources of the lahures nor the confidence of the Janakpuris. After the abolition of the Zamindari system, which at least distributed power among a few tribal chiefs, the tribes in the plains were in a shambles. They had begun to lose land, the forests, and with these their bread and dignity.
The Panchayat system by its discriminatory structure ingrained in its high caste ideology not only dismantled the local, power structures and cultural networks, it beefed up the hill high castes with power in various forms, and subjugated and impoverished the tribes, all tribes, but especially the smaller tribes, such as the Rajbanshis, the Dhimals, the Kabash, and so on.
But this Observer, by virtue of his migratory history, ethnicity, education, and profession could have bridged the gap and become a mediator of the ethnic complexities in Nepal. He was a learned man, who had completed at least his masters in one of the social sciences. So he knew some theories, some world history, some comparative structures and principles. And as a college teacher in the Valley, he himself was in an alien land, in the heart of Newar culture. So he perhaps had some knowledge of what it means to know culturally different people with their own rich linguistic and cultural histories. He could reflect upon his condition, the state, and nationalism. Yet it seemed that people like him became educated only to serve the cause of prejudice in a more sophisticated fashion. The positive potential of all his experience seemed to have been nullified before the sweeping influence of the state ideology and prevailing mores, forming a vicious circle when it interacted with and reinforced the prejudices of the laity.
As long as people looked like him, spoke his language, had identity like his, they were fine. And if they didn't look like him, then they were fine if they didn't have power and comparative knowledge. But as soon they came to claim to be his equal, they became bad, dangerous, an incentive to move out.
"What do you think of Biratnagar?" my fellow guard asked.
"South of Tintolia, things are not so good. It's too close to the
border", he said.
I now had begun to be skeptical of my father's faith in Saraswati's power to cleanse a person's heart. Saraswati could complicate the whole picture for the worse. I began to wonder if Nepal--the Nepal of the towns and power structure--was filled with people like this learned man. In time, I would know more.
(P.Mishra grew up in the Tarai. This is a much condensed version of the 5th in his series of essays on prejudice that have appeared in The Nepal Digest on the internet).
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Pramod Parajuli
This collection of articles by 17 well known critics of development focuses on what editor Wolfgang Sachs calls the "obituary of development". For the authors, the epoch of development that had dominated the arena of north-south relations for the last four or five decades, has come to an end. "The idea of development," writes, Wolfgang Sachs in the introduction, "stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape."
This collection heralds a unique phase in the history of development thinking. Until recently, the critics of development were like the legendary mice who talked about capturing the cat, subduing it and getting rid of it, but were unable to find the one who will bell the cat. This volume tries to catch development by its throat, announcing its demise. Inspired by the intellectual magnetism of Ivan Illich this group of scholars is engaged not only in the "archeaology of development ideas" but also in the enunciation of possible alternatives to traditional "development".
All the contributors share the premise that the other side of development is the invention of underdevelopment. This they trace to the inaugural address of U.S President Harry Truman on January 20, 1949. This address sets the stage for a discursive formation comprised of the "developed" and the "underdeveloped" worlds. On the one hand, the "developed" does not remain in the developed region; it becomes a project, not a place. It becomes a multi-layered enterprise claiming transparent universality. On the other hand, after this invention of underdevelopment, two billion people become "underdeveloped". Now two-thirds of the humanity is relegated to a state of underdevelopment. Gustavo Esteva, captures this paradox of how the triumph of the new order led to another colonization of the world. On that day, two billion people became underdeveloped. In a real sense, from that time on, they ceased being what they were, in all their diversity, and were transmogrified into an inverted mirror of other's reality: a mirror that belittles them and sends them off to the end of the queue, a mirror that defines their identity, which is really that of a heterogenous and diverse majority, simply in the terms of a homogenizing and narrow minority (p. 7).
The issue is not merely that of who said what to whom but precisely about the impact of this announcement on the equation of global power. By this announcement, so called underdeveloped populations were rendered manageable entities in a homogenizing enterprize. As Arturo Escobar has elaborated, this manageability was expressed through the discourse of "planning." Along with planning, other practices such as "strategizing," "monitoring," and "evaluating" were the mechanisms which set the milieu for intervention by the self appointed angels of development to the rest of the world.
Probably one of the most original contributions of this volume is demythicizing all the subsequent attempts to make development seem still plausible by adding prefixes to it. Aptly deconstructed are concepts such as ethnodevelopment (Esteva), participatory development (Rahnema), the currently popular discourse of sustainable development (Sachs, Shiva) and the innocence of the developmentalist state (Nandy). Several of the contributors make it clear that no amount of sugarcoating to the bitterpill of development is feasible. Development, they argue is intrinsically anti-participatory, anti-dialogical, anti-empowering for the so-called underdeveloped people. And they show how these so called development alternatives share the same premises underlying the original development discourse.
This book also questions socialist alternatives to capitalist patterns of development. This is where they differ starkly from even the neo-Marxian variants of social intervention such as the experiments in popular culture inspired by Antonio Gramsci and in critical pedagogy inspired by the Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire. Both these approaches have informed a variety of initiatives in which development can be used as a form of empowerment of the popular classes. Esteva puts it succintly, "Development became the central category of Marx's works: revealed as a historical process that unfolds with the necessary character of natural laws. Both the Hegelian concept of history and the Darwinist concept of evolution were interwoven in development, reinforced with the scientific aura of Marx"(p. 9). In a similar vein, Majid Rahnema in his contribution on "participation" has commented on the Freirean experiment of consciousness raising in which the developmentalist mind set of the so-called intellectual/activist is never questioned.
One of the core messages of this book is that doctrinaire socialism cannot offer an alternative to existing capitalist order because it tends to pose itself as a metanarrative by subordinating diversity. In one essay on socialism, Harry Cleaver writes that "we can avoid a great deal of conceptual and communicative difficulty by stopping using the terms 'socialism' or 'socialist development' as shorthands for what we want (p.247).
The contributors argue that the project of development is set up in such a way that it has already destroyed diversity in both culture and nature. Vandana Shiva makes an apt observation that "since nature needed to be developed by humans, people had also to be developed from their primitive backward states of embeddedness in nature. Nature's transformation into natural resources needed to go hand in hand with the transformation of culturally diverse people into "skilled human resources" (p. 207). This is how the concept of sustainable development comes into sharpest criticism. For both Sachs and Shiva, the idea of sustainable development as articulated by the Brundtland Commission, is not about sustaining nature or people's survival but development itself. As Shiva writes, "sustainability in this context does not involve recognition of the limits of nature and the necessity of adhering to them. Instead it simply means ensuring the continued supply of raw materials for industrial production, the ongoing flow of ever more commodities, the indefinite accummulation of capital" (p. 217).
The contributors to this volume definitely want us to go through an "epistemological break" from the developmentalist concepts, which did invent as well as perpetuate the myth of global scarcity (as opposed to maldistribution of resources and unequal access) and a sense of backwardness among the majority of people living in the so called Third World. All this is very welcome. However, I feel a tremendous incompleteness in the theoretical assertion of this kind when these authors are unable to link their critiques with the emergent voices at the grassroots. Blending of such a worthwhile critique with the voice of the voiceless would definitely strengthen the import of this exercise.
I do not mean to imply that such deconstructionist critiques are not needed; they are urgent. Because in many respects, people at the bottom might not be cognizant of the importance of their day to day critical practices or even equipped to articulate their implications to the knowledge empire and industry. Even while shouldering the duty of a committed intellectual to do so, it should be our own moral imperative to link our alternative theories to the voices from the grassroots.
(Pramod Parajuli is interested in organic farming and grassroots movements).
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Samrat Upadhyay
In Sanjay Nigam's The Snake Charmer, the main character Sonalal asks a doctor, "What's the matter with me, doctor sahib? What?" And Dr. Basu, looking Sonalal straight in the eye, tells him, "It's called guilt."
Around this central concept of a man's guilt and his search for redemption, Nigam concocts a novel that perhaps should have remained the short story (published in the magazine Grand Street) from which it grew. In short, the novel is too long for what it does. That's saying a lot about a work of a "mere" 223 pages, especially when compared to the mountainous books Indian authors are capable of producing, such as Seth's A Suitable Boy, Chandra's Red Earth and Pouring Rain, and Mistry's A Fine Balance.The main problem is that Nigam fails to create a character compelling enough so that we can joyfully participate in his physical and psychological journeys. One quarter into the book, and Sonalal appears as a whiner, and the reader is inclined to say, "Get on with it, man! What's wrong with you?"
The novel starts with Sonalal, the best snake charmer in Delhi and possibly India, as he bites his favorite snake Raju in two in front of foreign journalists because the already-defanged Raju strikes him on the calf for playing a wrong note. Sonalal's subsequent fame and fortune only add to his intense guilt at having killed a pet he considered his eldest son. Accompanying the guilt is the fear that Raju's mate Rani will seek him out for revenge. Thus begins Sonalal's odyssey seeking a melee of doctors, magicians, his favorite prostitute Reena, and at times even his wife Sarita, who appears as the only interesting and endearing character in the novel, primarily because she is down-to-earth and doesn't suffer the annoying maladies with which the author relentlessly afflicts Sonalal.
The main problem with Nigam's storytelling is that he promises too much but delivers little. In the end, we know as much about Sonalal as we did at the beginning: that he bit his snake in two and is feeling guilty. A confused, muddled quality marks the various stages of his journey in search of remedies to his ailments. The overall effect is that The Snake Charmer, while constantly driving home the point as to how, and in what ways, Sonalal is tormented, lacks the emotional intensity of good fiction. Sonalal's relentless fluctuation between hope and despair provides the novel several bizarre instances of denouement, each time making it seem as if Sonalal's understanding of his situation has gone to a higher level. Unfortunately, this turns out to be illusory, and once more we are mired in Sonalal's thoughts, listening to the same weeping, whining, whimpering voice, ad infinitum.
There are other ways in which The Snake Charmer doesn't deliver what it promises in the first several pages. Sonalal's relationship with Reena the prostitute is intriguing, but why Reena loves and understands him more than others do remains a bit of a mystery, especially given that she is a prostitute. Nigam never fully shows what about Sonalal she finds charming enough that she's willing to go with him to Udaipur to spend a week--at her expense. Also, her abrupt, congenial break-up with him at the end of the vacation comes across a heavy-handed authorial device to compound Sonalal's misery. Moreover, it is odd that while Sonalal feels a larger-than-life guilt over his murder of Raju, he shows no remorse at leaving his wife and children at home and gallivanting to Udaipur with his favorite prostitute. If The Snake Charmer is indeed the journey of a man seeking moral absolution, as it seems to be on the surface, then Nigam could have done better by at least showing in Sonalal a modicum of love towards his wife, who actually emerges as the true heroine of the novel, someone who is earthly, judiciously takes care of money, and tries to knock sense into Sonalal.
The metaphor of a snake biting its own tail recurs throughout the novel. While explaining the structure of benzene, a chemical that "makes marvelous aromas," Dr. Seth tells Sonalal that a scientist named Kekule dreamt that benzene looked like a snake biting its own tail. This image gets imprinted upon Sonalal's mind, and he also understands that the benzene smell is the same as ether, which links the universe. But Nigam uses the metaphor so conspicuously that it becomes a convoluted device to hold the novel together and to perhaps show how history nearly repeats itself in Sonalal towards the end of the story.
The Snake Charmer is an unimpressive debut by Nigam, who is a physician on the Harvard University faculty in the USA. Roughly a quarter into the novel, a circus master offers Sonalal a lucrative job in the circus: get into a cage with a harmless tiger and pretend to bite it. Sarita wants him to take the job. "I could die," Sonalal roars. "Nobly," says Sarita. One gets the feeling that the novel, too, could have ended nobly had it encountered an early death.
(Samrat Upadhyay is a student of creative writing).
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